globalization and security

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G
LOBALIZATION AND
S
ECURITY
:
M
IGRATION AND
E
VOLVING
C
ONCEPTIONS OF
S
ECURITY IN
S
TATECRAFT
AND
S
CHOLARSHIP
C
HRISTOPHER
R
UDOLPH
The pace of technological change is so fast that sometimes it seems the
world will be completely different from one day to the next.
terests? Few would question that we live in an era of extraordinary
change—technological, economic, social, and political—but scholars
disagree whether globalization is something truly new or simply the continu-
ation of a process underway for centuries.
1
Even skeptics, however, concede
that, although the capitalist world-system has been globalizing for hundreds of
years, the speed and degree of that globalization have increased tremendously
in recent decades.
2
Even before George H. W. Bush popularized the term
“new world order,” there was a growing sense that globalization’s effects were
Christopher Rudolph is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
Thanks to Jason Ackleson, Richard Friman, Jim Hollifield, Sarah Lischer, Nick Onuf, Art
Stein, and the two anonymous reviewers for
Security Studies
for their comments and suggestions
on earlier drafts. The financial support of the Center for International Studies is gratefully
acknowledged. A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the
International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, 25 February–1 March 2003.
1. Cf. Christopher Chase-Dunn, “Technology and the Changing Logic of World-Systems,” in
Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructural Agenda in International Relations
, ed. Ronen Palan
and Barry Gills (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 85–106; James N. Rosenau,
Along the Domestic-
Foreign Frontier
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Saskia Sassen,
Globalization and
Its Discontents
(New York: New Press, 1998); Giovanni Arrighi, “Globalization, State Sovereignty,
and the ‘Endless’ Accumulation of Capital,” in
States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy
, ed.
David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik (New York: Routledge, 1999), 53–
73; Immanuel Wallerstein, “States? Sovereignty? The Dilemmas of Capitalists in an Age of
Transition,” in Smith, Solinger, and Topik,
States and Sovereignty
, 20–33; Manuel Castells,
The
Rise of the Network Society
, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S.
Nye, “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?),”
Foreign Policy
,no. 118 (spring
2000):104–19; James Mittelman,
The Globalization Syndrome
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000); and Geoffrey Garrett, “The Causes of Globalization,”
Comparative Political Studies
33, nos. 6/7 (August/September 2000): 941–91.
2. Chase-Dunn, “Technology,” 181.
SECURITY STUDIES
13, no. 1 (autumn 2003): 1–32
Published by Frank Cass, London.
DOI: 10.1080/09636410490493822
Bill Gates
D
OES GLOBALIZATION SHAPE
the way states define their security in-
2
SECURITY STUDIES 13, no. 1
fundamentally changing the world order and international politics. Yet what
is the nature of that change?
To understand this new world order, contemporary changes must be studied
in historical context—with an eye not so much on pivotal turning points, but
on the dynamic process of incremental change. Globalization has established
a complex matrix of cause-and-effect relationships whose resulting political
impulses can best be understood by reconsidering static concepts of security.
3
International relations theorists have noted the rise of trading states and the
emergence of complex interdependence—two developments strongly linked
to globalization that have fundamentally altered the structural environment—
which in turn affects state interests.
4
I argue that trading-state grand strategy
has compounded the scope and pace of globalization and has prompted new
security issues and objectives.
5
In particular, not only has the emergence of
trading states made control over trade and capital flows an essential compo-
nent of state grand strategy, but migration has emerged as a key issue in the
construction of a contemporary security paradigm. Migration now rests at the
nexus of three essential elements of the contemporary security dilemma: (1)
the production and accumulation of economic power; (2) the changing nature
of war, especially between combatants with highly disproportionate power and
resources; and (3) growing concerns regarding social identities and the poten-
tial effect that threats to national identity have on governmental legitimacy in
a system of nation-states (see figure 1).
In illustrating the process that has brought migration to this pivotal po-
sition, I presume an international system of egoistic states operating under
anarchy. I begin by examining the geopolitical, technological, economic, and
ideational factors that contributed to the scope and pace of globalization in
the late twentieth century and discuss how these factors affect traditional secu-
rity paradigms and the assumptions on which they are built. In the following
section, I present a genealogy of perspectives on security to illustrate how
3. I am not concerned here with whether my thesis challenges how “security studies” defines
itself. Rather, I take the term “security” at face value and place it in the context of a changing
world, attempting to show how these changes shape ideas and interests, as well as state be-
havior and political strategy. Cf. Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies after the
Cold War: An Agenda for the Future,” Working Paper (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs, Harvard University, December 1991); and Stephen M. Walt, “The
Renaissance of Security Studies,”
International Studies Quarterly
35, no. 2 (1991): 211–39.
4. Richard Rosecrance,
The Rise of the Trading
State (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and Robert
O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,
Power and Interdependence
, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins,
1989).
5. See Rosecrance,
Trading State
. Barry Posen,
The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and
Germany Between the World Wars
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) defines grand strategy
as a state’s theory for creating security through military and diplomatic means (p. 13). I use
the term more broadly to refer to the state’s strategy for maximizing gains along each of three
dimensions of security—military, material, and societal. It represents the constellation of the
balance between competing dimensions.
Migration and Evolving Conceptions of Security
3
Figure 1
M
IGRATION
:A
TTHE
N
EXUS OF
T
HREE
D
IMENSIONS OF
S
ECURITY
changing structural and ideational environments shape security interests and
the grand strategies employed to realize them. From this evolutionary perspec-
tive, the link between grand strategy, increased pressures for the movement of
global factor and trade flows, and globalization more generally becomes clearer.
Trading-state grand strategy emphasizes the strong economic gains resulting
from such movement, but increasing levels of international migration have
heightened sensitivity to demographic change in receiving states, especially
when flows have continued despite state efforts to curtail them. This has led
to a divergence in security interests between developed and developing states.
Whereas developed states have witnessed the rise of an identity-centered secu-
rity interest in response to global migration, developing states have witnessed
the rise of a concomitant “expatriate politics.”
6
Moreover, rising frustrations
regarding the unequal gains of globalization have allowed the emergence of
6. On identity and security, see Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre
Lemaitre, eds.,
Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe
(New York: St. Mar-
tin’s, 1993); Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds.,
TheReturn of Culture and Identity in IR
Theory
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Christopher Rudolph, “National Security and Interna-
tional Migration” (University of California, Los Angeles, 2003); and Myron Weiner and Sharon
Stanton Russell, eds.,
Demography and National Security
(New York: Berghahn, 2001). On the rise
of expatriate politics, see Wayne A. Cornelius and Thomas Espenshade, “The International
4
SECURITY STUDIES 13, no. 1
terrorism as a “weapon of the weak,” and migration has emerged as a poten-
tially crucial element in global terrorism. Each of these factors represents a
salient element of a multifaceted security challenge facing international society.
I conclude by suggesting that accurate models of world politics must move
beyond traditional security paradigms, acknowledging the interrelationships
between the economic, political, and societal dimensions of state grand strat-
egy. Considerable literatures discuss each of these dimensions, but few have
attempted to sketch an integrated theoretical landscape that allows us to see
the proverbial forest, not just trees.
E
VOLVING
N
OTIONS OF
S
ECURITY
S
ECURITY HAS BEEN
the cornerstone of the study of international relations—
its
raison d’etre
.
7
Presumably, by understanding the factors that contribute
to the existence of cooperation or conflict—war or peace—the study of inter-
national relations can make some contribution to global well-being. Realists
suggest that, in a Hobbesian world, survival lies at the core of all action.
8
Al-
though the Peace of Westphalia (1648) demarcated lines of sovereignty among
states and gave form to our current international system, it guaranteed neither
systemic stability nor state survival. Thus states have been forced to engage in
what some scholars have characterized as “an inherently open-ended, compet-
itive, and risk laden power struggle.”
9
Given this scenario, security is commonly
defined as “a condition in which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a
country are guaranteed.”
10
In the volatile global environment, security emerged
as the primary function of the state, since it is a prerequisite to establishing sys-
tems of governance that provide for the needs of the governed. The difficulty
of establishing and maintaining security in the early period of state formation
Migration of the Highly Skilled: ‘High-Tech Braceros’ in the Global Labor Market,” in
The
International Migration of the Highly Skilled
, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Thomas Espenshade, and
Idean Salehyan (La Jolla: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of Califor-
nia, San Diego, 2001), 3–19; and Laurie Brand, “States and Their Expatriates: Explaining the
Development of Tunisian and Moroccan Emigration-Related Institutions” (paper presented at
the Center for International Studies, University of Southern California, 27 February 2002).
7. Cf. Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies”; and Walt, “Renaissance of Security
Studies.”
8. Robert G. Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in
Neorealism and
Its Critics
, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 301–21.
9. Gianfranco Poggi,
The Development of the Modern State
(Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1978), 60.
10. Steven L. Speigel and Fred L. Wehling,
World Politics in a New Era
, 2nd ed. (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1999), 492.
Migration and Evolving Conceptions of Security
5
is evident: most early efforts to build states in Europe failed.
11
Consequently,
self-preservation emerged as a function of power, and the energies of the state
focused primarily on military organization and preparation for war.
12
The cold war and the development of nuclear weapons increased this preoc-
cupation with arms production and military affairs among both policymakers
and academicians and served to reinforce the realist view regarding security.
Thus, scholarship addressing security issues developed along a path distinct
from that examining economic processes, with the realist paradigm priori-
tizing military affairs in considerations of power and state security over the
past half-century.
13
The“golden age” of security studies generally ignored
those who recognized the importance of economic factors in security affairs,
from classical writers to modern theorists such as E. H. Carr, Jacob Viner,
and Albert Hirschmann. Yet as Carr rightly reminded us, “military and eco-
nomic weapons are merely different instruments of power.”
14
Even in a world
dominated by cold war realpolitik, significant economic changes emerged. In
response, whereas security studies generally saw stasis and maintained a strong
dichotomy between “high” (that is, military) and “low” (that is, economic) pol-
itics, the emerging field of international political economy (
IPE
) focused on
systemic changes occurring in international economics.
15
In documenting the rise of trading states during the modern era, Richard
Rosecrance identified long-term changes that favored a global trading system
over one based on the accumulation of power via territorial conquest.
16
He
argues that security in the trading-state world, while by no means rendering
11. Hendrik Spruyt,
The Sovereign State and Its Competitors
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1994); and Charles Tilly, ed.,
TheFormation of Nation States in Western Europe
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975).
12. Otto Hintze, “Military Organization and the Organization of the State,” in
The Historical
Essays of Otto Hintze
, ed. Felix Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 180–215; and
W. H. McNeill,
The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000
(New York:
Basic Books, 1982).
13. Michael Mastanduno, “Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship,” in
Ex-
ploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics
, ed. Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and
Stephen D. Krasner (Cambridge:
MIT
Press, 1999), 185–214; and Beverly Crawford, “Hawks,
Doves, but No Owls: International Economic Interdependence and the Construction of the
New Security Dilemma,” in
On Security
, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1995), 149–86.
14. E. H. Carr,
Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations
, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 119.
15. Cf. Richard N. Cooper,
The Economics of Interdependence
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968);
Susan Strange, “International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Ne-
glect,”
International Affairs
46, no. 2 (1970): 304–15; Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World
Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” in Keohane,
Neorealism and Its Critics
, 158–203; and
Richard N. Cooper,
Economic Policy in an Interdependent World
(Cambridge:
MIT
Press, 1986).
16. Rosecrance,
Trading State.
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